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We found that there is a perception of ‘under-saving’ for retirement among many 
individuals. Individuals who perceive they have saved inadequately attribute this mainly 
to having insufficient income. Under a lifecycle model of consumption with a known 
income path this is not a reasonable answer. Those with low income today who fail to 
save will have even lower consumption levels in the future and could increase lifetime 
utility by reallocating consumption from pre-retirement to post-retirement. Unexpected 
outcomes in earnings, however, may cause households that planned to reach retirement 
with adequate savings, not to realize their plans. The decline in real wages that began in 
1973 suggests a compelling explanation for low wealth levels: individuals were surprised 
by low earnings growth and thus under-saved relative to their lifetime incomes. We find 
that the hypothesis fits the data for those with extreme outcomes but does not explain 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Social Security wealth, possibly augmented with pensions wealth, is the main economic 
resource that supports retired households although Social Security alone will only provide 
enough resources to keep a household marginally above the poverty line. Many elderly 
household units do not have pension income: just 45 percent of households with a person aged 
65-69 had either private pension income or public pension income in 1994, and the fraction 
decreased with age (Grad, 1996).  For many households, then, their own savings are needed to 
provide for adequate retirement consumption.   
Some households approaching retirement age have saved adequately for retirement and 
some have saved very little or nothing at all (Smith, 1995; Gustman and Juster, 1996; Venti and 
Wise, 1996).  Social programs such as Social Security and Medicare may have substituted for 
private saving, but this explanation is only reasonable for households in the lower part of the 
income distribution.   Households farther up in the income distribution with little private saving 
may have to reduce consumption sharply during retirement, which is not consistent with the 
implications of the main theoretical model for saving behavior, the life cycle model of 
consumption.  The savings of households that are otherwise similar, as measured by current 
income or by a measure of lifetime income, can be very different. For example, in the Health and 
Retirement Study, median non-housing wealth among those with household income of $25-$50 
thousand was $34 thousand yet, the 25th percentile was just $9.5 thousand and the 10th 
percentile just $1.2 thousand (Gustman and Juster, 1996).  There are, of course, some obvious 
explanations for the differences in savings among household with similar earnings.  Some 
households may have saved at an adequate rate, but they had unexpected large expenses such as 
medical or educational expenses.  Some may have had interrupted earnings histories, which 
caused their savings plans not to be realized.  
The goal of this research is to explore the role of unexpected low earnings growth in 
explaining the variation in wealth levels of household with similar lifetime earnings near 
retirement. To accomplish this goal, we use data on individuals born between 1931 and 1941 and 
their spouses from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  In the aggregate, empirical evidence 




that began in the mid-1970s.  It was likely unanticipated, and according to the life-cycle model it 
would have led households to under-save.  
Figure 1 shows real wages for the years 1956 to 1993 based on published data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics of annual hourly earnings in 1982 dollars.  From 1956 to 1973 the 
annual growth rate of real wages was 2 percent per year.   1973 marks the end of rapid earnings 
growth and is followed by a long period of declining real wages.  By 1993, real wages were only 
87 percent of the 1972 level.   
In 1966, the period of high real wage growth, the typical person in the HRS cohort was 
30 years old.  A life-cycle growth rate would have been combined with the secular trend, so that 
someone from the HRS cohort would probably have anticipated very high rates of income 
growth. Such a person may have begun saving at a rather late age.  Even someone with a low 
subjective time rate of discount may have delayed saving.  Real wage rates, however, began to 
decline beginning in 1974 when many of the HRS cohort were in their early 40's;  therefore, 
many in the HRS cohort may have reached their high-saving years with real incomes that were 
considerably lower than they had forecast and, as a consequence, they under-saved relative to 
their lifetime earnings. 
Although some households may have experienced unexpected low earnings, others did 
not experience these shocks.  Thus, to explore our hypothesis, we match Social Security earnings 
data with panel data from the main HRS survey and with data from experimental modules. Using 
respondents’ Social Security earnings records from 1951 to 1991 we calculate lifetime labor 
earnings, and we estimate for each individual earnings as a function of a quartic in age.  For each 
individual we calculate an earnings growth rate as the first derivative of the earnings-age 
equation evaluated at a particular age.  The second derivative, the change in earnings growth, is 
our indicator of a surprise in earnings growth.  Thus the test is to hold lifetime earnings and 
earnings growth constant and to examine whether individuals with downward sloping earnings 
growth paths had lower wealth levels near retirement than those without downward sloping 
earnings growth paths. We estimate wealth levels in 1992 as a function of lifetime earnings, 
earnings growth and the change in earnings growth, controlling for other demographic 
characteristics.  Due to measurement error in our measure of lifetime earnings, we employ 
instrumental variables estimation.  We find that a decline in real income growth, as measured by 




consistent with our hypothesis that some of the subjective shortfall in wealth at retirement is due 
to an unexpected slowdown in wage growth.  However, the magnitude is small for most 
households:  only for those with extreme changes in wage growth is the effect quantitatively 
important. 
2.  Previous Studies 
 
The standard model for analyzing saving decisions is the life-cycle model (LCM) of 
consumption, also know as the “life cycle hypothesis” (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954).  
According to this model individuals and households choose a consumption path that will 
maximize lifetime utility.  A fairly restrictive version of the LCM specifies that the only 
uncertainty is the date of death (Yaari, 1965).  An important prediction is that households will 
accumulate savings during the working life, and spend some of the savings to finance 
consumption following retirement.  Although the exact level of asset accumulation will depend 
on utility function parameters and the interest rate, a useful illustrative case is when the 
parameters are such that the consumption path is flat as a function of age.  Then, in the absence 
of social programs such as Social Security and other forms of saving such as pensions, and 
holding the retirement age constant, an individual will save a fixed fraction of lifetime earnings.  
The intuitive appeal of this result is that if someone is poor during working life, he should still 
save.  Otherwise, he will be very poor following retirement, which cannot be optimal.  Lifetime 
utility could be increased by reallocating some consumption from the working life to the retired 
life.  This result is useful to establish as a baseline because it makes clear that within the context 
of the LCM permanently low income cannot be a reason for not saving.  Of course, if income is 
temporarily low rather than permanently low, someone will save at a lower rate or even a 
negative rate during that period. 
With mandatory Social Security and Medicare systems these results will be altered for 
households with low income.  Once again, take the case where under the LCM the optimal 
consumption path is flat, and consider someone with very low earnings.  Because of the 
progressive structure of Social Security and Medicare benefits, a very poor household may find 
that its standard of living would increase after retirement even if it had no other resources.  The 




benefits so that consumption during the work life would be increased at the expense of 
consumption after retirement.  However, Social Security cannot be used as collateral for a loan, 
so this option is not available (Hurd, 1990).  The next best solution is to retire when first eligible 
for Social Security benefits and, except for a claim on Social Security and Medicare, not to 
accumulate assets except possibly owner-occupied housing for its consumption value.  This kind 
of model can explain the high rate of retirement at age 62 even though Social Security is 
approximately actuarially fair from age 62 to age 65 (Hurd and Boskin, 1984).   
Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) find that social programs, if they are large in relation 
to earnings levels, can explain low or zero saving rates among some households.  This, however, 
is not likely to be an explanation for low saving rates among middle-income households.  
Consider, for example, a single worker whose earnings were average throughout his career.  
Then in 1995 his wage would have been $1,929 per month (Social Security Administration, 
1996).  Yet his monthly benefit were he to retire at age 62 would have been $702.  The implicit 
value of Medicare and the differences in taxation of earnings and Social Security would reduce 
the difference between pre-retirement and post-retirement income somewhat, but, nonetheless, 
by relying only on Social Security the worker would have considerably less consumption in 
retirement than pre-retirement.  Under the LCM this outcome would not be optimal: the worker 
could increase lifetime utility by saving during his work life.   The conclusion is that, within the 
framework of the LCM, social programs can explain low saving rates among low-income 
households, but not among households with moderate to high income levels. 
The overall conclusion is that for the population at the lower end of the income 
distribution a lack of retirement wealth could be explained by social programs, but not for 
households in the middle part of the distribution.  Therefore, the life cycle model, which is the 
main theoretical model of consumption and saving, apparently cannot explain some important 
features of the data. 
A moderate extension of the life-cycle model allows for unexpected outcomes both for 
earnings and for expenses (Browning and Lusardi, 1996).  For example, families have 
unexpected expenditures such as uninsured medical expenses or higher than expected 
educational expenses.  These families may have planned to reach retirement with adequate 
resources, but were not able to realize their plans.  On the earnings side, workers may have 




earnings were higher, but in fact they had spells of unemployment or perhaps their earnings were 
flat.  From a lifetime perspective, they would not have saved enough early in their work life, and 
so they would not have reached retirement with enough actual savings relative to their lifetime 
incomes.  Allowing for a stochastic life-cycle model, Engen, Gale and Uccello (1999) study the 
adequacy of household savings by simulating optimal wealth-earnings ratios among 
observationally equivalent households.  Using data from the HRS and the Survey of Consumer 
Finance, they analyze whether observed data are consistent with patterns of an optimizing model 
with earnings uncertainty.  Although their general conclusion is that households are largely 
saving adequately, they acknowledge the sensitivity of their results to assumptions of the model.  
From our perspective their paper is valuable because it shows that unexpected events can 
generate substantial variation in wealth outcomes even though individuals are behaving 
optimally. 
Another type of explanation for differences in savings across households has to do with 
varying subjective time rates of discount.  That is, some people strongly prefer present 
consumption to future consumption causing them rationally to choose not to save (Dynan, 1993).  
While this may be true, it is not really an explanation.  First, it is not testable without bringing in 
independent data on time preferences; yet data that plausibly measure only time rates of discount 
are rare if nonexistent.  For example, the level of education is likely to be at least a weak 
measure of the time rate of discount but it is also related to a number of other unobserved 
personal characteristics and correlates of lifetime resources.  Therefore, even holding constant 
observed measures of lifetime earnings, one could not expect the variation in savings as a 
function of education to show the variation in saving rates caused by variation in time rates of 
discount.  The financial planning time horizon is often used as a measure of the subjective time 
rate.  The rationale for using this measure is that someone with a high subjective time rate of 
discount discounts the future so much as not to care very much about future consumption.  
Therefore it is not worth planning for the distant future.  This measure, again, is not a direct 
measure of the subjective time rate, and likely refers literally to the planning horizon, not to the 
subjective time rate.  Finally, in the absence of restrictions on the data, explaining variation in 
saving rates as variation in time rates of discount basically restates the problem that apparently 
similar people reach retirement with very different wealth levels because their tastes are such that 




The LCM can explain a number of general features of the data.  On average workers save 
at high rates during their 50s, when earnings usually reach a maximum and expenses have 
declined from the child-raising ages.  The LCM predicts lower savings levels at advanced ages, 
which is typically found in panel data (Hurd; 1987, 1990, 1995, 1997).  Also consistent with the 
LCM, Hurd, Smith and Zissimopoulos (2003) find that workers with high mortality risk retire 
earlier than workers with low mortality risk.  Yet, there are a number of important features that, 
while not necessarily inconsistent with the LCM, are more difficult to explain.  Many households 
in the middle of the income distribution apparently have inadequate levels of saving; among 
those with similar incomes wealth varies widely; and low levels of saving lead to a high risk of 
poverty should a surviving spouse live to extreme old age.  
 
3.  Data 
 
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to explore the hypothesis that 
among individuals with similar lifetime earnings, those who experienced unexpected low rates of 
earnings growth, have lower retirement wealth than those who do not experiences these shocks.  
The HRS is a biennial panel with emphasis on retirement behavior and how it is affected by 
health status, economic status and work incentives.  At baseline in 1992 the HRS had 12,652 
respondents and was nationally representative of individuals born in 1931-1941 and their spouses 
except for over-samples of blacks, Hispanics and Floridians (Juster and Suzman, 1995).  The 
HRS has a complete inventory of assets and these data appear to be of very high quality due to 
innovative survey techniques (Juster and Smith, 1997).  In this study our main outcome measure 
is wealth levels in 1992 and is computed as the sum of wealth from real estate, businesses, IRAs, 
stocks, bonds, checking accounts, CDs and housing less the value of the mortgage, home loans 
and other debt.  Missing data on wealth are imputed.
1 Other wealth variables include pension 
wealth and Social Security wealth. Social Security wealth is computed as the present discounted 
value of future benefits at age 62, and as combined wealth for married couples and individual 
wealth for single individuals.
2  The expected, discounted value of pension wealth at age 62 is 
computed assuming a 6.3 percent interest rate, 5 percent wage growth and 4 percent inflation.
3 
                                                 
1 The imputation process is described in SSA-HRS Data Documentation (StClair et al., 2002). 




The data from the first wave of the survey are linked with Social Security earnings 
records. The earnings data are based on historical earnings from 1951-1991 reported to the 
Social Security Administration and are available for 9,539 HRS respondents.
4  The matched data 
are well-suited for analyzing earnings dynamics.  The administrative records are accurate and 
less subject to measurement error than self-reported earnings from household surveys.  The data 
set covers a long history of earnings:  from 1951 to 1991.  That said, there are also several 
shortcomings.  The level of earnings is reported up to the Social Security maximum.  This 
maximum changed over time as did the number of individuals whose earning were above the 
maximum.  In 1951, 1.4 percent of HRS respondents with matched record had earnings that 
exceeded the maximum.  This percentage increased over the years to reach a maximum of 26.6 
percent in 1971 and then decreased to 5.2 percent in 1991.  In addition, individuals employed in 
a sector not covered by Social Security have no earnings records for the years he or she is 
employed in the uncovered sector.
5    
We use Social Security earnings as a measure of lifetime labor income.  Lifetime 
earnings are calculated as the present discounted value (3 percent real interest rate) of real Social 
Security earnings adjusted to 1992 dollars using the CPI-U-RS, and we adjust for the upper 
truncation of Social Security earnings by using information on the quarter of the calendar year in 
which earnings reached the upper limit.
 6  We use data on 9,382 HRS respondents that have a 
record of positive Social Security covered earnings.  Social Security earnings may be a noisy 
measure of actual lifetime earnings, and it may underestimate lifetime earnings of individuals 
with substantial earnings from employment in sectors not covered by Social Security.  We return 
to this issue later.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Needs and Retirement Wealth  for information on the Social Security Earnings file. 
3 The pension data was derived from the HRS wave1 Pension Plan Detail Data Set and using the Pension Estimation 
Program. 
4 See Haider and Solon (2000) for a discussion of characteristics of individuals with and without matched Social 
Security records. 
5 In 1996 92% of non-self-employed wage and salary workers were covered by Social Security.   
6 The adjustment method is based on the idea that the quarter of the year in which a worker reached the maximum 
can be used to estimate the quarterly flow of earnings, and, once the quarterly flow is known annual uncapped 
earnings estimated.  For example, if a worker reached the maximum in two quarters we estimated that his or her 




The key variable for this study is individual earnings growth rates.  We estimate an 
earnings model for 7,839 respondents with 10 years of reported covered earnings between the 
ages of 21 and 60.
7  In the model of earnings, we only use observations on years with positive 
earnings and we correct for partial years or work with the goal of estimating potential full year 
earnings.  Using a tobit model to account for right censoring of observations above the Social 
Security maximum, for each individual we separately estimate log earnings as a function of a 
quartic in age.
8  With parameter values for each individual obtained from the estimation, we 
calculate an earnings growth rate as the first derivative of the earnings-age equation evaluated at 
each age.  The second derivative, the change in earnings growth at age 30, is our indicator of a 
surprise in earnings growth:  we interpret the change in the growth path at age 30 to be 
unexpected.  We use age 30 because it is early in an individual’s work career and the HRS cohort 
reached age 30 between the years 1961 and 1971, before the actual downturn in real wage 
growth. 
In addition to data previously described, we use data from the wave 3 experimental 
modules.  Experimental modules, appearing in each survey wave, are sets of questions of a 
speculative or experimental nature that are asked of a random subset of the respondents.  In wave 
3, which was fielded in 1996, modules 9 and 10 were devoted to some experimental questions 
about saving behavior and saving outcomes.
9 Questions in Module 9 and 10 were designed to ask 
directly about self-perceptions of savings adequacy and reasons for this inadequacy.
10   
 
4.  Savings Adequacy 
 
Aggregate data on wage trends described previously supply indirect support of our 
hypothesis.  At the individual level, our analysis of data from the experimental modules in the 
HRS provides clues about savings behavior and motivates this study of inadequate retirement 
                                                 
7 Earnings are converted to 1992 dollars using the CPI-UR-S and weighted to reflect quarters worked per year.  The 
top and bottom 1% estimated earnings growth rates are trimmed.  We use the 7,555 observations where estimates 
converged.   
8 Murphy and Welch (1990) show that a quartic specification fits the data better than the commonly used quadratic 
specification. 
9 In module 9, 573 individuals were asked about their savings behavior and in Module 10, 476 individuals. 





11  In Module 9, respondents were asked if they saved enough: “Thinking of your saving 
over the past 20 or 30 years, do you think now that what you saved was about right, too little, or 
too much?"  All else equal, with random events that average out to zero, we expect to have 
approximately the same number of “too little” and “too much.”  The data, however, show an 
asymmetry.  Seventy two percent of the respondents stated they saved too little, 26 percent saved 
about right and only about 1.5 percent said that they had saved too much.  The objective data on 
lifetime income and wealth correspond to the subjective self-assessments.  Mean and median 
wealth are approximately twice as high among those who saved enough compared to wealth 
among those who saved too little (Table 1).  Households who "saved about right" have a higher 
wealth to lifetime income ratio indicating a greater saving rate.  Individual level shocks cannot 
explain the high percentage of people who state they saved too little which suggests there may be 
something more systematic.   
In Module 10 respondents are asked " Including any income that you expect from Social 
Security or pensions, will you have enough savings to maintain your current living standard after 
retirement?"  The aim of the question was to elicit the respondent's evaluation of their future 
standard of living shortly after retirement.  Among those still working about 64% of the 
respondents anticipate being able to maintain their current standard of living after retiring (Table 
2).  Although a much higher percent report being able to maintain their standard of living after 
retirement than those who report they saved adequately, the comparison is inexact.  Individuals 
in the workforce may report that they did not save enough but anticipate saving more before 
choosing to retire.  Moreover, because of unexpected events, individuals may have saved 
inadequately for retirement but in response to this shock, had lowered consumption before 
retirement and thus will not experience a change in standard of living pre- and post-retirement.  
Respondents do appear to be aware of the adequacy of their financial status.  Among 
those still working, the level of self-reported retirement wealth is approximately 4 times higher 
for respondents who saved adequately than for respondents who did not save enough and their 
wealth to income ratio is higher:  1.94 versus 0.62 (Table 2).  Among those with a shortfall in 
retirement wealth, the self-reported additional amount needed is $91.2 thousand (Table 2).  
                                                 
11 This section was largely reproduced from an earlier paper (Hurd and Zissimopoulos, 2000) which provides a more 
complete study of savings behavior based on the experimental modules.  See also Venti and Wise (2000) for a 




When added to actual retirement wealth, this amount would provide a total of $122.6 thousand, 
which is almost exactly the same wealth level as those who report having enough savings to 
maintain their current standard of living in retirement.        
The most common answer by working respondents as to why they do not have enough 
savings to maintain their current standard of living after retirement is low or insufficient income 
(Table 3).  In the LCM with a known income path this is not a reasonable answer.  Those with 
low income today who fail to save will have even lower consumption levels in the future.  Thus 
lifetime utility could be increased by reallocating consumption from pre-retirement to post-
retirement.  Unexpected outcomes in earnings as well as for other expenses, however, may cause 
households that planned to reach retirement with adequate savings, not to realize their plans.  
This is the hypothesis we test. 
 
5.  Income growth and retirement wealth 
 
  We examine the earning growth profiles of the 1931-1941 HRS cohort based on our fitted 
estimates as described in Section 3.  Figure 2 shows the earnings growth rate for males and 
females in the HRS by age.  The growth rates are averages of the first derivatives of the 
individual earnings paths.  At age 25, earnings growth for males was 7.7% and 4.1% for females. 
By age 40, growth was negative for females and for males.  The HRS cohort reached age 40 
between the years 1971 and 1981, largely a period of declining real wages.  
Cohort differences in the HRS are described in Table 4.  Table 4 shows average earnings 
growth over the ages 25 to 40 and ages 41 to 55 by birth cohort categories.   Generally, the 1940-
1941 cohort had lower earnings growth at young ages and larger earnings declines than the 
oldest HRS cohort born 1931 and 1932.  This is true for both males and females and is consistent 
with the time trend shown in Figure 1.  Indeed, according to the growth in real wages described 
in Figure 1, the 1931 and 1932 cohort would have experienced rising real wage rates up to age 
42 and then periods of sharp declines until wage rates flattened out around age 52.  In contrast, 
the 1940 and 1941 cohort experienced growth in real wages only until about age 32, then falling 
wage rates until about age 42 when wage rates began to flatten out.  Thus our panel estimates 




Earnings profiles of HRS respondents, based on averages of our individual level 
estimates, are shown by education and experience in Figure 3 and Figure 4 for males and females 
respectively.  As expected, earnings are ordered by education with college educated individuals 
revealing the highest earnings at all experience levels.  Moreover, college graduates had greater 
earnings growth than individuals with lower levels of education.   An increase in the education 
premium in the 1980s is well-established in the literature on earnings dynamics (see Levy and 
Murnane, 1992, for a review of the literature).  Katz and Murphy (1992) attribute education 
premium to the growth in relative demand for college educated workers as well as changes in the 
rates of growth of different labor force groups.  These demand and supply shifts and their effects 
on earnings were likely to have been unexpected by workers. 
This conclusion is reinforced by data on the experience of previous cohorts.  Figures 5 
and 6 shows weekly earnings for 3 cohorts:  workers age 25-29 in 1950, age 25-29 in 1960 and 
age 25-29 in 1970.  These synthetic cohorts are based on cross-sectional data from the 1950, 
1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 PUMS.  Figure 5 shows weekly earnings for individuals with 9 to 11 
years of education.  Among these individuals, the 1950 cohort realized an almost doubling of 
their weekly earnings from ages 25-29 to ages 45-49.  The 1960 cohort realized less of an 
increase over 20 years and the 1970 cohort saw their earnings rise by only 11 percent. Figure 6 
shows weekly earnings for individuals with 16 or more years of education.  In contrast, to 
workers with fewer years of education, all cohorts experienced substantial earnings growth albeit 
the 1950 cohort witnessing the largest amount of growth.  The HRS cohort was 19-29 years old 
1960.  Thus, initially the cohort had strong wage growth but later on average they experienced 
less earnings growth than previous cohorts, particularly workers with low levels of education.   
In sum, the macro-level data on wage rate trajectories are consistent with low wage 
growth as an explanation for low wealth levels.  Our results show that as a cohort, HRS 
respondents experienced declining real earnings by age 40 and zero or negative earnings growth 
thereafter.   
 





Table 5 shows wealth as a function of lifetime earnings.
12   Lifetime earnings of 
households in the lowest 20th percentile of the earnings distribution are $275,023 and total 
wealth for these households is $91,001.  In contrast, lifetime earnings of households in the 
highest 20th percentile of the earnings distribution are $2,435,259 and total wealth for these 
households is $356,236. Within a lifetime earnings group, however, wealth is highly skewed.  
For example, median household wealth for households in the 20th to 40th percentile is $47,025 
compared to mean wealth of $122,952.
13  
Table 5 shows that individuals will accumulate different amounts of wealth because of 
differences in their lifetime earnings.  That said, there is substantial variation in wealth levels 
among households with similar levels of lifetime earnings.  Some HRS respondents did save 
adequately and undoubtedly some respondents did have earnings paths that satisfied their 
expectations.  Thus, to explain savings levels at the household level we examine individual-level 
earnings paths and indicators of whether these paths were unexpected holding constant lifetime 
earnings.   
 
Unexpected earnings growth and wealth 
 
As an informal test of the hypothesis that a change in earnings growth early in the work 
life led to reduced wealth at retirement we tabulate wealth levels as a function of lifetime 
earnings growth at age 30 and the change in earnings growth at age 30 (Table 6).  Lifetime 
earnings are categorized as above or below the median;  earnings growth and the change in 
earnings growth are categorized as negative or non-negative.   
  For males workers with lifetime earnings above the median, and high earnings growth, 
those with a positive change in earnings growth had $434,007 in wealth compared to $279,045 
of wealth for individuals a negative change in earnings growth.  This pattern holds for 
individuals with high lifetime earnings and low earnings growth.  This pattern is also seen for 
male respondents with low lifetime earnings. This table is consistent with the hypothesis that 
                                                 
12 Total wealth is composed of wealth from housing, real estate, vehicles, business, IRAs, stocks, checking accounts, 
CDs, bond less value of mortgages, home loans and other debt. 
13 Venti and Wise (2000), studied wealth as a function of lifetime earnings.  In this study we emphasize wage 




individuals were surprised by low earnings growth, and saved less than individuals who did not 
experience an unexpected downturn in earnings.  Wealth levels examined in Table 6, however, 
are based on household levels and this table controls for the earnings growth of only one member 
of the household for multi-person households.  Moreover, the classification of lifetime earnings 
into high and low leaves considerable variation within these categories;  therefore, we move to a 
regression framework.  
 
6.  Retirement wealth estimation results  
 
We study the effect of household lifetime earnings, and each adult’s earnings growth and 
change in earnings growth at age 30 on household wealth holding.  We use in the analysis 5,446 
households where at least one individual in the household has at least ten years of Social Security 
covered earnings from age 21 to 61.  The specification holds constant marital status, age, a 
respondent's financial planning horizon, and Social Security and pension wealth, and examines 
the effect of earnings growth, the change in earnings growth, and lifetime earnings on wealth.  
The earnings growth variables for males and females in a married household are weighted by the 
ratio of each spouse’s lifetime earnings to household lifetime earnings. 
As we noted in Section 3 there are two main problems with measuring lifetime earnings 
as the present discounted value of Social Security covered earnings:  the level of earnings is 
reported up to the Social Security maximum; and individuals employed in a sector not covered 
by Social Security have no earnings records for the years he or she is employed in the uncovered 
sector.  Furthermore, the comparison of wealth with lifetime earnings aggregated to later ages at 
a fixed interest rate to find a saving rate may involve considerable error.  For example, someone 
who anticipates flat earnings will save early in life, and those savings will experience the interest 
rate path from a young age to 1992.  Another person with rising wages will save late in life and 
those savings are exposed to interest rates from older ages to 1992.  Thus people who intended to 
reach retirement with the same level of wealth could reach retirement with very different levels.  
This lack of an exact comparison can be thought of as observation error on lifetime earnings. 
The top panel of Table 7 shows mean lifetime earnings and total wealth stratified by 
lifetime earnings percentiles.  We also show the wealth to lifetime earnings ratios.  The table 




highest wealth to earnings ratio (0.33).  This finding is inconsistent with the literature that finds 
saving is concentrated among those with high income, wealth and education.  This result is likely 
due to misclassification in lifetime earnings percentiles because of observation error.  In 
comparison, the bottom panel shows wealth to lifetime earnings ratios by years of education (for 
males).  Mean lifetime income increases across education groups.  The role of measurement error 
is brought out:  using education as a variable to categorize lifetime earnings we find that the rate 
of saving out of lifetime income increases in income rather than falls.
14 
To address this issue of measurement error in lifetime earnings, we use instrumental 
variables estimation (IV).  The source of identification is variation in lifetime earnings resulting 
from differences in the industry worked on the job with the longest tenure.  Several studies have 
noted the decline in income for high school educated men due to decreases in the demand for 
these workers in the manufacturing sector during the 1980s.
15  For a review see Levy and 
Murnane, 1992.  We assume there is no correlation between unobserved variables in our wealth 
equation and industry categories. 
Table 8 shows the estimation results for log total wealth, using industry of longest job as 
instruments for log household lifetime earnings.
16  Lifetime earnings have a large effect on 
wealth levels.  A 1 percent increase in a household’s lifetime earnings increases wealth by 0.65 
percent.  Once lifetime earnings are controlled for we do not expect an effect of earnings growth 
at age 30 on wealth and indeed we do not find one for either males or females.  For men, the 
effect of the second derivative is positive and statistically significant, and the magnitude is 
moderate:  For men the standard deviation in the second derivative is 0.085, so a change of two 
standard deviations in the second derivative increases wealth by about 20 percent.  For women, 
there is no effect of a change in earnings growth on household wealth.   In that 83 percent of the 
women in this sample are married, the effect is primarily identified from married women.  We 
return to interpreting the economic content of the change in earnings growth and lifetime 
earnings results in a simulation exercise described below. 
                                                 
14 This method is similar to instrumental variables estimation using education as the instrumental variable. 
15 For example, one hypothesis notes that a high dollar made imports cheaper and reduced demand for 
manufacturing output. 
16 The means of the right-hand variables are given in Appendix Table A, the first stage regression results of the 




The specification includes several additional variables of interest including age, financial 
planning horizon and other wealth.  Financial planning horizons over one year have a positive 
effect on wealth relative to a planning horizon of one year or less.  The effect is economically 
important, a planning horizon of 10 years or more increases wealth by 83 percent for men and 56 
percent for women relative to individuals with a planning horizon of one year or less. The 
subjective time horizon is often used as a measure of subjective time rates of discount.  The 
rationale for using this measure is that someone with a high discount rate discounts the future so 
much as not to care very much about future consumption, and, therefore, would not engage in 
long-term planning. The expected, present, discounted value of pension wealth at age 62 has a 
positive impact on wealth, which is likely picking up unobserved taste for savings.   
Table 9 uses the regression estimates to simulate differences in total wealth due to 
differences in earnings growth and then due to difference in lifetime earnings.  The simulations 
are based on a married household with individuals of ages 60 to 61 and with 10-year financial 
planning horizons.  All other covariates take on mean values.  A household with a change in 
earnings growth at the 5
th percentile of the distribution (for males) is simulated to have $89,231 
in total wealth in 1992.  In contrast, a household with a change in earnings growth at the 95th 
percentile has total wealth of $94,400.  The differences are not large.  Indeed, the micro level 
data, using our measure of unexpected earnings growths, cannot explain large wealth differences 
on average.  What it does explain is differences in wealth for those individuals who had 
decidedly bad or good outcomes:  that is, those at the extremes of the distribution (1
st and 99
th 
percentile).  In contrast, if we compare a household with lifetime earnings at the 10
th percentile 
compared to the 90
th percentile (holding change in earnings growth at its mean value), wealth 
differences are $40,866 compared to $163,924.  
  
7.  Conclusion 
 
We found that there is a perception of ‘under-saving’ for retirement among many 
individuals.  Individuals who perceive they have saved inadequately attribute this mainly to 
having insufficient income.  Under a lifecycle model of consumption with a known income path 
this is not a reasonable answer.  Those with low income today who fail to save will have even 




consumption from pre-retirement to post-retirement.  Unexpected outcomes in earnings, 
however, may cause households that planned to reach retirement with adequate savings, not to 
realize their plans. The decline in real wages that began in 1973 suggests a compelling 
explanation for low wealth levels:  individuals were surprised by low earnings growth and thus 
under-saved relative to their lifetime incomes. We find that the hypothesis fits the data for those 
with extreme outcomes but does not explain large wealth differences for individuals on average. 
Future work will examine cohort differences as a method for understanding unexpected 
earnings growth and its impact on savings.  At this stage in the analysis we do not have the data 
available to control for age in order to study cohort differences. We can begin to examine cohort 
effects using future waves of the HRS.  Alternatively, The Longitudinal Retirement History 
Survey, based on individuals age 58-63 in 1969, can be linked with Social Security earnings 
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Source:  Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 








Source:  HRS 1992 and Social Security earnings records.   
Notes:  Based on estimated earnings growth model. 
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Table 1.   
Self-Assessed Savings Adequacy Over Past 30 years:  
Wealth and Lifetime Income (thousands) 
 
    Wealth Lifetime Income  Wealth to Income
Saved too Little  Percent  Mean Median Mean Median
 
Mean Median
Yes 72.6%  171.4 92.5 1227.7 1256.6 0.14 0.07
No 27.4%  350.8 177.9 1460.8 1536.8 0.24 0.12




Retirement Wealth: Actual and Needed (thousands) and Household Income (thousands) 
 
  Saved Enough to Maintain Standard of Living 
After Retirement? 
  Yes (64%)  No (36%) 
 
































Table  3.   
Self-Reported Causes of Inadequate Saving 
 
Causes of Inadequate Savings  Percent
Income too Low  26.9
High cost of Living  25.0
Mistake 20.2
Extraordinary Expenditures  9.6
Other 18.3
Total 100.0
Number of observations:  104.  Based on Module 10 
respondents who expect lower standard of living in 







Earnings growth by cohort 
 
 Males    Females   
Birth Cohort  Age 25-40  Age 41-55  Age 25-40  Age 41-55 
1940-41 0.0023  -0.1018  0.0140  -0.1031 
1938-39 0.0073  -0.0650  0.0149  -0.0816 
1936-37 0.0143  -0.0819  0.0180  -0.0551 
1933-35 0.0181  -0.0705  0.0210  -0.0491 
1931-32 0.0219  -0.0719  0.0186  -0.0691 
Source:  HRS 1992 and Social Security earnings records 1951-1991. 







Household Wealth and Lifetime Earnings by Household Lifetime Earnings Quartiles 
 
Lifetime earnings  Lifetime earnings Total wealth  Financial wealth 
Percentiles Mean Mean Median Mean Median
0-20th 275,023 91,001 28,100 19,355 0
21st-40th 714,355 122,952 47,025 28,062 1,000
41st-60th 1,233,475 164,632 68,000 30,690 3,250
61st-80th 1,768,821 231,768 114,300 45,142 10,000
81st and above  2,435,259 356,236 186,600 99,734 28,000
All 1,285,598 193,348 81,725 44,607 5,000
Note:  Lifetime earnings are calculated as the present discounted value (3% real interest rate) of real Social Security 





Mean household wealth by lifetime earnings, earnings growth and change in earnings 
growth - Males 
 
  Total Wealth  
 Lifetime  earnings 
 High  Low 
  Earnings growth age 30  Earnings growth age 30 
Change in earnings growth age 30  High  Low  High  Low 
High  434,007 289,152 121,964 139,253 
Low  279,045 212,545 112,938 125,256 
Notes:  High lifetime earnings indicates above 50 percentile.  High earnings growth and change 




Table 7.   
Lifetime Earnings, Wealth and Wealth to Earnings Ratios by Lifetime Earnings Percentiles 
and Years of Education 
 
  Lifetime earnings percentiles 
  Lifetime earnings Total Wealth Wealth/Earnings
Percentiles Mean Mean Ratio
0-20th 275,023 91,001 0.331
21st-40th 714,355 122,952 0.172
41st-60th 1,233,475 164,632 0.133
61st-80th 1,768,821 231,768 0.131
81st-100th 2,435,259 356,236 0.146
Years  Years of education - males 
1-8 1,042,360 80,661 0.077
9-11 1,379,778 137,109 0.099
12 1,522,748 189,246 0.124
13-15 1,513,084 226,420 0.150
16+ 1,654,138 435,890 0.264
Notes:  Number of observations is 5,446 for lifetime earnings percentiles and 3,834 for education 









 Table 8.   
Estimates of Determinants of Log Total Wealth: 




Log household lifetime earnings  0.651 0.022
Male - wage growth at age 30  0.722 0.308
Male -change in wage growth at 30  1.203 0.026
Female - wage growth at age 30  -0.803 0.352
Female - change in wage growth at 30  -0.025 0.970
Not married - male  -1.458 0.000
Not married - female  0.121 0.673
Planning horizon 2-10 years-female  0.469 0.000
Planning horizon more than 10 years-female  0.564 0.002
Planning horizon missing-female  -0.071 0.770
Planning horizon 2-10 years-male  0.706 0.000
Planning horizon more than 10 years-male  0.833 0.000
Planning horizon missing-male  0.178 0.351
Social Security Wealth at age 62  0.093 0.000
Pension wealth at age 62 - female  0.048 0.000




R-squared (adjusted)  0.228 
Notes:  Includes age dummies, an indicator for age for non-age eligible spouses and controls for missing spouse 




Table 9.   
Simulated Total Wealth Results 
 











































Appendix Table A:  Mean, Standard Deviation of Right-Hand Side Variables in Table 8. 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.
Log household lifetime earnings  13.789  0.862
Male - wage growth at age 30  0.010  0.065
Male -change in wage growth at 30  -0.002  0.085
Female - wage growth at age 30  0.009  0.062
Female - change in wage growth at 30  -0.007  0.082
Not married - male  0.090  0.286
Not married - female  0.173  0.378
Planning horizon 2-10 years-female  0.527  0.499
Planning horizon more than 10 years-female  0.071  0.257
Planning horizon missing-female  0.035  0.184
Planning horizon 2-10 years-male  0.476  0.499
Planning horizon more than 10 years-male  0.065  0.247
Planning horizon missing-male  0.070  0.255
Social Security Wealth at age 62  8.634  5.299
Pension wealth at age 62 - female  5.250  5.764
Pension wealth at age 62 - male  6.988  5.949
Males age 54-56  0.171  0.376
Males age 57-59  0.165  0.371
Males age 60-61  0.100  0.301
Females age 54-56  0.192  0.394
Females age 57-59  0.172  0.377
Females age 60-61  0.100  0.300
Age ineligible females 45 years old or younger  0.068  0.251
Age ineligible female 46-50 years old  0.124  0.330
Age ineligible female 62 years and older  0.023  0.151
Missing female earnings growth observation  0.227  0.419
Female has no Social Security record match  0.060  0.238
Age ineligible males 45 years old or younger  0.008  0.089
Age ineligible male 46-10 years old  0.022  0.147
Age ineligible male 62 years and older  0.153  0.360
Missing male earnings growth observation  0.123  0.328
Male has no Social Security record match  0.067  0.249







Appendix Table B.  First Stage IV regression for Log Household Lifetime Earnings 
 
 Coef.  P>|t|
Intercept  0.331 0.013
Male - earnings growth at age 30  0.557 0.000
Male -change in earnings growth at 30  0.519 0.001
Female - earnings growth at age 30  0.489 0.000
Female - change in earnings growth at 30  -0.310 0.000
Not married - male  -0.546 0.000
Not married - female  0.091 0.000
Planning horizon 2-10 years-female  0.124 0.000
Planning horizon more than 10 years-female  -0.029 0.527
Planning horizon missing-female  0.093 0.000
Planning horizon 2-10 years-male  0.064 0.072
Planning horizon more than 10 years-male  -0.011 0.767
Planning horizon missing-male  0.331 0.013
Males age 54-56  0.049 0.060
Males age 57-59  0.054 0.050
Males age 60-61  0.149 0.000
Females age 54-56  0.057 0.022
Females age 57-59  0.102 0.000
Females age 60-61  0.135 0.000
Age ineligible females 45 years old or younger  -0.116 0.001
Age ineligible female 46-10 years old  -0.068 0.022
Age ineligible female 62 years and older  0.040 0.467
Missing female earnings growth observation  -0.146 0.000
Female has no Social Security record match  -0.267 0.000
Age ineligible males 45 years old or younger  -0.354 0.000
Age ineligible male 46-10 years old  -0.122 0.033
Age ineligible male 62 years and older  0.106 0.001
Missing male earnings growth observation  -0.423 0.000
Male has no Social Security record match  -1.036 0.000
Social Security Wealth at age 62  0.030 0.000
Pension wealth at age 62 - female  0.027 0.000
Pension wealth at age 62 - male  0.027 0.000
Industry for Males   
Agriculture  -0.392 0.000
Mining/construction  -0.086 0.006
Transportation  -0.205 0.000
Wholesale  -0.027 0.548
Retail  -0.070 0.050
Financial/Insurance/RealEstate  -0.022 0.663
Business/Repair Service  -0.023 0.631
Personal Service  -0.064 0.414
Professional related services  -0.221 0.000
Entertainment/recreation  -0.095 0.338
Public Administration  -0.442 0.000
Industry missing  -0.252 0.000




Agriculture  -0.216 0.003
Mining/construction  0.056 0.537
Transportation  0.099 0.036
Wholesale  0.031 0.612
Retail  -0.106 0.001
Financial/Insurance/RealEstate  0.113 0.005
Business/Repair Service  -0.111 0.022
Personal Service  -0.221 0.000
Professional related services  -0.041 0.134
Entertainment/recreation  0.039 0.654
Public Administration  -0.158 0.003
Industry missing  -0.086 0.014
Number of observations  5,446 
R-squared 0.547 
   






Appendix Table C.  Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Log Total Wealth 
 
 OLS   
 Coef.  P>|t| 
Log household lifetime earnings  1.241 0.000
Male - wage growth at age 30  0.536 0.443
Male -change in wage growth at 30  0.901 0.083
Female - wage growth at age 30  -1.054 0.214
Female - change in wage growth at 30  -0.292 0.647
Not married - male  -1.270 0.000
Not married - female  0.509 0.022
Planning horizon 2-10 years-female  0.412 0.000
Planning horizon more than 10 years-female  0.488 0.006
Planning horizon missing-female  -0.044 0.856
Planning horizon 2-10 years-male  0.650 0.000
Planning horizon more than 10 years-male  0.794 0.000
Planning horizon missing-male  0.188 0.322
Social Security Wealth at age 62  0.075 0.000
Pension wealth at age 62 - female  0.031 0.000




R-squared (adjusted)  0.238 
Notes:  Includes age dummies, an indicator for age for non-age eligible spouses and controls for missing spouse 
earnings data because of no earnings or no Social Security record match. 